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Abstract
Many scholarly articles on corruption give the impression that the
world is populated by two types of people: the "sanders" and the
"greasers". The "sanders" believe that corruption is an obstacle to de-
velopment, while the "greasers" believe that corruption can (in some
cases) foster development. This paper takes a critical look at these
positions. It concludes that the evidence supporting the "greasing
the wheels hypothesis" is very weak and shows that there is no cor-
relation between a new measure of managersactual experience with
corruption and GDP growth. Instead, the paper uncovers a strong
negative correlation between growth in genuine wealth per capita a
direct measure of sustainable development and corruption. While
corruption may have little average e¤ect on the growth rate of GDP
per capita, it is a likely source of unsustainable development.
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1 Introduction
Corruption, understood as "sale of government property for private gain",
is a persistent feature of human societies. Yet, societies in which corruption
thrives at one point in time are not necessarily destined to that state for
ever. The road from corrupt to honest politics is, however, intertwined in
complex ways with economic and political transitions (Paldam, 2002). In
fact, most economists1 view corruption as a major obstacle to development.
It is seen as one of the causes of low income and is believed to play a critical
role in generating poverty traps (e.g., Blackburn et al., 2006, 2008; Andvig
and Moene, 1990). In short, corruption, according to this view, "sands"
the wheels of development and it makes economic and political transitions
di¢ cult. But there exist dissenting voices. Voices who argue that corruption
"greases" the wheels of development and through that fosters growth. The
most prominent advocate of this view is probably Le¤ (1964) but he is by
no means alone. The general idea is that corruption facilitates benecial
trades that would otherwise not have taken place. In doing so, it promotes
e¢ ciency by allowing individuals in the private sector to correct or circumvent
pre-existing government failures of various sorts. Perhaps the most quoted
example of this is "speed money" paid by business people to government
o¢ cials to speed up bureaucratic procedures.
This paper takes a critical look at the link between corruption and eco-
nomic development. The analysis centers on whether corruption is sanding or
greasing the wheels of development. In section 2, I discuss these two views in
some detail and develop a simple theoretical framework that highlights some
of the fallacies associated with the view that corruption is e¢ cient. In sec-
tion 3, I evaluate micro level evidence from eld experiments and surveys of
rms and their managers. Virtually all such evidence supports the "sanding
the wheels hypothesis" and the case for the "greasing the wheels hypothesis"
rests solely on anecdotal evidence. In section 4, I evaluate some recent tests
of the "greasing the wheels hypothesis" conducted on cross-national data.
These tests explore cross-national variation in perceived levels of corruption
in broad samples of developed and developing countries to estimate the ef-
fect of corruption on growth in real GDP per capita. I argue that these
tests fail to deliver robust evidence in favour of the "greasing the wheels hy-
pothesis". Most importantly, I show that, with one exception, all the claims
made about the corruption-growth nexus based on statistical analysis of the
perception-based indices of corruption disappear when a cross-national index
of managersactual experience with corruption is used to approximate cor-
1See, e.g., Murphy et al. (1993) and Mauro (1995).
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ruption patterns across countries. This nding lends weight to the critique
that corruption perceptions are likely to be colored by the economic perfor-
mance of the country being evaluated thus producing a spurious negative
correlation between the two and casts serious doubt on the widely held
belief that corruption has a sizeable negative e¤ect on economic growth in
general.
This does, however, not mean that corruption is harmless  the micro
evidence clearly demonstrates that it is not. Even at the macro level there
is ample evidence that corruption a¤ects adversely many of the proxy causes
of economic growth e.g., investment in manufactured and human capital.
Moreover, high levels of corruption tend to go hand in hand with a lack of
political accountability and with disrespect for property rights, factors which
themselves tend to be obstacles to economic growth. More fundamentally,
however, there is a sense in which the focus on growth in GDP per capita
is misguided. Ultimately, development is about sustainable improvements in
human welfare. It is well-known that GDP per capita is not a measure of
welfare. In Section 5, I argue that new research into the links among wel-
fare, sustainable development and corruption is urgently needed. Based on
recent work by Partha Dasgupta and others on genuine wealth (see, Das-
gupta, 2001), I take the rst modest step in that direction and present some
new results that show a strong negative correlation between corruption and
growth in genuine wealth per capita. This correlation is surprisingly robust.
In particular, it applies equally to perceived corruption and to managers
actual experience with corruption and it is robust to the use of instrumen-
tal variables. Overall, while corruption may have little average e¤ect on the
growth rate of real GDP per capita, it is a likely source of unsustainable
development.
2 Two Di¤erent Views on Corruption
The view that corruption can be e¢ cient  or that it greases the wheels
of commerce has a long history.2 It rst gained prominence back in the
1960s with a provocative article called "Economic Development Through
Bureaucratic Corruption" by Nathan Le¤ (see, Le¤, 1964). Since then it
has been given a theoretical foundation by works of, for example, Lui (1985)
and Beck and Maher (1986) and most recently, various empirical claims have
been made in its favour. For example, Egger and Winner (2005, p. 949)
conclude
2The discussion in this section is based on Aidt (2003). For alternative surveys of the
literature, see Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001) and Svensson (2005).
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"using a data set of 73 developed and less developed countries,
we nd that corruption is a stimulus for FDI, which conrms
the position of Le¤ (1964) that corruption can be benecial in
circumventing regulatory and administrative restrictions."
The general idea is that corruption facilitates benecial trades that would
otherwise not have taken place. In doing so, it promotes e¢ ciency by allowing
individuals in the private sector to correct pre-existing government failures
of various sorts. Le¤ uses the following example to set the stage. Back in
the early 1960s, the relevant government agencies in Chile and Brazil were
charged with the task of enforcing price controls for food products. In Chile,
an honest agency enforced the freeze and food production stagnated. In
Brazil, a corrupt agency e¤ectively sabotaged the freeze and production in-
creased to the joy of consumers. Another piece of anecdotal evidence of how
corruption can grease the wheels and be benecial is Daniel Levys fascinating
account of how an illegal market, supported by a chain of bribe payments3,
emerged during the Soviet era in the Republic of Georgia (Levy, 2007). Its
aim was to overcome the problem of shortage and other ine¢ ciencies associ-
ated with the centrally-planned economy. Although signicant real resources
had to be devoted to run this market, it can hardly be disputed that cor-
ruption allowed the Georgian economy to produce far more output and to
allocate what was produced far more e¢ ciently than would otherwise have
been feasible.
An alternative view of corruption is that it creates rather than corrects
ine¢ ciencies. This view has a long tradition within public choice (e.g.,
Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). It has more recently
been given new life by Shleifer and Vishny (1993, 1998, chapter 1). They
have, in fact, coined the term "the grabbing hand" to describe how corruption
arises because government o¢ cials seek rents whenever they can, subject only
to the constraints given by economic, legal and political institutions. One
example of this is the Philippines under the Marcos regime where cheap
credit, tax incentives, state licences and monopoly privileges hinge on per-
sonal considerations(and) state resources are .... appropriated for private
ends(Hutchcroft, 1991). Another example comes from Russia after the fall
of the Soviet Union where a system of ill-dened property rights, corruption,
and Maa-style crime developed (Varese, 1997).
It is instructive to formalize the conceptual di¤erences between these two
views in some detail. As in Aidt and Dutta (2008), consider, therefore,
an economy in which individuals can choose between two occupations. An
3See Hillman and Katz (1987) for a formal model of such chains.
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individual can either be a worker and earn wage income w(:) or become an
entrepreneur, hire workers and earn prot income ai (:), where ai is the
talent or productivity of individual i. To keep it simple, I suppose that
individuals are either talented with ai = a > 1 or not with ai = 1. The
wage is increasing in the number of rms, which I denote by n. On the
other hand, prots are decreasing in n because there is more competition.
An individual decides to become an entrepreneur if ai (n) w (n) > 0. In a
free market, talented individuals set up rms until the return from the two
occupations is the same, i.e., a (H)  w (H) = 0 where H is the number
of rms at equilibrium.4 We notice that the First Welfare Theorem applies
and that this outcome is allocatively e¢ cient. There is, therefore, no reason
for government intervention.
Yet, suppose that the government introduces a licensing system that re-
quires an individual to obtain permission to set up a rm. The system has
no e¤ect on the economy unless the government issues fewer licences than
H . In that case, the economy becomes allocatively ine¢ cient and successful
entrepreneurs earn more than the going wage. Let me consider two di¤erent
scenarios.
In the rst scenario, the number of licences  is given and less than H .
The task of the government is to allocate these licences among the population.
It would be easy to do so if talent could be observed, but often it cannot. One
possibility then is to allocate the permits randomly, but, by doing so, some of
the rms would end up being run by untalented entrepreneurs. Another pos-
sibility is to let a corrupt government o¢ cial "sell" the licences to the highest
bidders. Clearly, by setting the price at a
 

   w   > 0 only talented
individuals will pay the bribe. As a consequence, the xed number of licences
will be put to the best possible use: corruption is e¢ ciency-enhancing in the
sense that more output will be produced in the economy with corruption than
in the one without. However, there are two critical points to notice. Firstly,
the corrupt economy is still allocatively ine¢ cient, so corruption can only
improve e¢ ciency in a second-best sense. That is, given a set of unavoidable
distortions already created by the government, corruption can promote ef-
ciency by helping agents to circumvent these distortions; yet the rst-best
would be to remove the distortions themselves. Secondly, one would have
to ask why the "wheels" need greasing in the rst place, and that question
leads me to the second scenario.
Suppose that the aim of the government itself is to extract rents from the
economy. Such a government would "sell" licences () to the private sector
4We assume that the number of talented individuals in the population is larger than
this and that  (H)  w (H) < 0.
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at the price p() and keep the revenues p (). To extract rents, rents must,
however, be created through articial scarcity. The way to do so is to create
an ine¢ cient licensing system with a limited number of licences on o¤er. As
before, these will be snapped up by the talented entrepreneurs, but it is clear
that the bribe maximizing number of licences is below the e¢ cient allocation
(H): if the government were to issue H licences no one would be willing to
pay for them.
The critical point is that corruption and ine¢ cient regulation are two sides
of the same coin. On the one hand, ine¢ cient regulation is needed to generate
scarcity rents. On the other hand, scarcity rents create corruption potential
because individuals are willing to pay (for licences and other government
policies) only if there is scarcity. In other words, the very distortions that
corruption is supposed to help individuals avoid or overcome may well be
put in place and maintained by corrupt politicians precisely because of their
corruption potential. Or put slightly di¤erently, even if corruption helps
overcome cumbersome regulation in the short term, it creates incentives to
create more such regulation in the long term. This is the fallacy of e¢ cient
corruption: it is, at best, misleading to argue that corruption can be e¢ cient
when, in fact, the very purpose of many of the most unvieldy and ine¢ cient
government interventions are caused by corrupt government o¢ cials in the
rst place. At worse, such an argument is dangerous because it encourages
tolerance to corruption.
Moreover, even if we were to accept that corruption can sometime grease
the wheels, there is another fallacy luring in the background. In the example
above, the creation of the rent (through the licensing system) causes e¢ -
ciency losses, but the process of extraction is merely a transfer of income
from the private sector to a government o¢ cial a transfer that was vol-
untary and therefore benecial to all parties involved. As highlighted by a
large literature on rent seeking5, the jobs of those government o¢ cials are
contestable. As a consequence, real resources, sometimes of a value equal
to the total bribe revenues, are wasted in contesting these jobs and, in the
process, entrepreneurial talent is misallocated (e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier,
1998). This makes it even more doubtful if corruption can ever be said to be
e¢ cient.
Of course, which of the two views is a better description of how the
world actually works cannot be settled purely on theoretical grounds; it is an
empirical matter. In the follows sections, I shall present and evaluate some of
the available evidence, starting with evidence gathered at the microeconomic
level and then moving on to macroeconomic evidence based on cross-country
5See, e.g., Nitzan (1994), Hillman (2009, chapter 2) or Congleton et al. (2008).
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comparisons.
3 Micro evidence
Most corrupt activities are outright illegal and those which are in the grey
area of the law are, at best, risky. Individuals involved with these activities,
therefore, go a long way to conceal what they do6 and corruption is by its
very nature (mostly) unobserved. Researchers must, as a consequence of this,
nd ingenious ways of measuring it and inferring its consequences from what
can be observed.
Let me start with evidence related to the "sands in the wheels hypoth-
esis". In the mid-1980s, the sociologist Hernando de Soto organized a very
interesting social experiment in Peru (de Soto, 1990). He was concerned that
(too) much economic activity and wealth accumulation took place outside the
formal economy and wanted to understand why. To this end, he asked teams
of researchers to go out and undertake a seemingly simple task: obtain all the
permits and approvals needed to start a small two-sewing machine garment
factory in a Lima shanty town legally and record the time and e¤ort required
in this endeavor. The result of the experiment is striking. It took about
300 days of 6 hours per day or, put di¤erently, what would correspond to
32 times the monthly minimum wage to complete the task. It is easy to see
why most entrepreneurs prefer to stay in the informal sector and why those
who try to become legal might be tempted to cut the red tape by paying
"speed money". But one strongly suspects that many of these regulations,
whatever their original rationale might have been, are kept in place with the
sole purpose of allowing bribes to be collected. Djankov et al. (2002) conrm
this suspicion. They asked similar questions about the number of procedures
that a small start-up rm must go through to become legal in a sample of 85
countries, and they report a strikingly strong correlation between this and
(perceived) corruption levels. Against this background, it is hard to main-
tain that corruption is anything but ine¢ cient: it clearly distorts policies
and creates contestable rents.7
Another important piece of evidence suggesting that corruption is an ob-
stacle to development comes from the expenditure tracking surveys recently
6A counter-example in which corrupt activities, including the payment of bribes, were
documented in great detail comes from Peru in the 1990s (McMillan and Zoido, 2004).
7Corruption can also allow agents circumvent e¢ cient regulation. Bertrand et al.
(2007), for example, study corruption in the driving licensing process in Delhi. They nd
that not only did the average applicant pay more than twice the o¢ cial price, but many
unqualied drivers ended up getting a licence and they did so because they were willing
and able to pay for the privilege.
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undertaken by the World Bank. The purpose of these studies was to quan-
tify how large a fraction of public funds earmarked for specic spending
programs actually reached the intended destination. The setting of one of
the rst tracking studies was Uganda in the beginning of the 1990s (Reinikka
and Svensson, 2004). At that time, Uganda had just emerged from a lengthy
period of dictatorship and civil war with an extremely run-down primary
school system. The schools were partly nanced through capitation grants
that allocated a xed amount per enrolled pupil. This rule made it relatively
easy to work out how much each school should receive. A comparison, then,
between what was disbursed from the treasury and what was actually re-
ceived by each school measured the misuse of public funds. This calculation
showed that as little as 12 per cent of the intended funds were ever received by
the schools. Corruption in District Administrations, which were responsible
for the allocation to the schools after the money had left the treasury, clearly
harmed primary education. Subsequent studies from other countries in the
region have revealed slightly smaller, but still very substantial, leakages of
funds. Given the importance of primary education in fostering development,
this type of corruption is clearly ine¢ cient. Olken (2006) goes one step fur-
ther in his study of an Indonesian anti-poverty program that was aimed at
distributing rice at a subsidized price to poor households. Not only does he
document that at least 18 per cent of the rice disappeared (it was presumable
stolen by corrupt village heads), he also shows that, for reasonable estimates
of the marginal cost of public funds, corruption turned a program that would
otherwise have been welfare improving into one which, in fact, reduced social
welfare.8
Let me now turn to the "greasing the wheels hypothesis". Besides the
anecdotal evidence discussed in the previous section, quantitative evidence
on this is sparse. Kaufmann and Wei (1999) ask if corruption really is "speed
money". To this answers this question, they use rm-level data from around
the world to link bribe payments to the time wasted by managers of rms
in dealing with bureaucrats. If bribes really were "speed money", one would
expect that those managers who answered yes to the question "is it common
for rms in your line of business to have to pay some irregular, addition
payments to get things done" would waste less time on such dealing than
other managers. Kaufmann and Wei (1999) report that the opposite is, in
fact, true! Along similar lines, Fisman and Svensson (2007) show, using a
survey of Ugandan rms, that a one percentage point increase in the bribery
rate is associated with a reduction in rm growth of three percentage points.
8See also Olken (2007) for an interesting eld study of corruption in road projects in
Indonesia.
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In conclusion, all attempts, I am aware of, to quantify the e¤ects of cor-
ruption at the microeconomic level suggest that corruption is much more
likely to sand than to grease the wheels. One will have to relay on anecdo-
tal evidence, such as Levy (2007), to nd instances of e¢ ciency-enhancing
corruption, or, perhaps, invoke cross-national macroeconomic evidence.
4 Macro evidence
What is the relationship at the macro level between corruption and eco-
nomic development? And what can this relationship reveal about whether
corruption is e¢ ciency-enhancing or not? Many scholars have tried to answer
these questions by looking for a relationship between data on growth in real
GDP per capita and cross-national measures of perceived corruption derived
from surveys of risk analysts, of business people and of citizens in di¤erent
countries. Some of this research, e.g., Mauro (1995) and Mo (2001), report
evidence, albeit not particularly robust, that, on average, corruption reduces
growth. Mauro (1995, p. 683), for example, concludes that "if Bangladesh
were to improve the integrity and e¢ ciency of its bureaucracy to the level of
that of Uruguay, ...., its yearly GDP growth rate would rise by over half a
percentage point."
This line of research, however, cannot answer the second question: is the
macroeconomic evidence consistent with corruption being e¢ ciency-enhancing
or not? This is because the "greasing the wheels hypothesis" does not pre-
sume that corruption is benecial everywhere. It only presumes that corrup-
tion can help in situations where other aspects of governance are decient
and/or economic policy is ine¢ cient. Accordingly, if the hypothesis is cor-
rect, then the relationship between corruption and economic growth must be
conditional on governance structures and/or economic policy. Moreover, the
relationship should be non-monotonic with positive growth e¤ects at low lev-
els of corruption only. This is because it is isolated instances of corruption,
not systemic corruption, that are supposed to help entrepreneurs. These in-
sights have been explored in a number of recent contributions to the debate
where three di¤erent ways of testing the "greasing the wheels hypothesis"
with cross-national data have been devised:
1. The marginal e¤ect of corruption is conditional on the institutional en-
vironment. In particular, the marginal e¤ect of corruption on growth is
positive in countries with decient political institutions or policies and
negative elsewhere (Méon and Sekkat, 2005; Méon and Weill; 2008).
2. There exists a growth maximizing level of corruption. In particular,
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at low levels of corruption the benecial e¤ects of corruption dominate
the detrimental e¤ects and vice versa (Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2006).
3. The e¤ect of corruption is regime specic and countries sort themselves
into di¤erent growth-corruption regimes, conditional on the quality of
their political institutions. In particular, in countries with good gover-
nance, the e¤ect of corruption on growth is negative, while in countries
with poor governance, the e¤ect is positive (or less negative) (Méndez
and Sepúlveda, 2006; Aidt et al. 2008).
These tests are, however, not simple to implement. For starters, a reli-
able empirical measure of corruption is needed. Several business risk analysts
and polling organizations routinely construct indexes of perceivedcorrup-
tion, based on survey responses of business people, of country experts and
of local residents. These indices, typically, measure corruption by asking
those surveyed to score a country with respect to the likelihood that govern-
ment o¢ cials would demand bribes. The three most popular of these indices
are the corruption perception index constructed by Transparency Interna-
tional (the TI index); the corruption index from the International Country
Risk Guide (the ICRG index); and the control of corruption index (the WB
index) from the Governance Mattersdatabase at the World Bank (Kauf-
mann et al. 2005). A major problem with all these indices is that they rely
on perceptions. It is quite possible that these perceptions are informed, not
only by conventional wisdom about what institutions and cultures may be
conducive to corruption, but also by the economic performance of the coun-
try being evaluated. If so, they cannot be used to infer neither the causes
of corruption nor the e¤ects on economic outcomes. Fortunately, the World
Business Environment Survey conducted in 1999-2000 provides an alterna-
tive cross-national index (the WBES index). It is based on survey responses
of managers living and working in particular countries about their own expe-
rience with corrupt o¢ cials and so, it portraits to measure actual, as opposed
to perceived, corruption.9 While this index avoids some of the potential bi-
ases associated with the perception-based indexes, it is clear that managers
may have incentives to understate their direct experience with corruption.
Treisman (2007) has thoroughly investigated the relationship between and
the determinants of the two types of indices. His ndings are enlightening:
9At the national level several other objective measures of corruption are available. This
include data on the number of o¢ cials convicted for corruption (see e.g., Alt and Lassen
(2003) for a study of US states and Del Monte and Papagni (2001) for a study of Italian
regions) and data on the amount of leakage from infrastructure projects in Italian regions
(Golden and Picci, 2005).
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he shows that the correlation between the two types of measures is very weak
and that many of the standard predictors of perceived corruption, such as
democracy and press freedom (Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2002) are mostly
unrelated to the WBES index.
A second major challenge is to establish causality. This challenge is linked
to three problems. Firstly, it is impossible to control for all factors that might
a¤ect growth in a single growth regression. Some of these omitted factors
are likely to be correlated with corruption and the e¤ect of such factors are
then wrongly attributed to corruption. Secondly, the causality may run from
growth to corruption rather than the other way around. Aidt and Dutta
(2008), for example, show how economic growth can reduce corruption be-
cause corrupt leaders want to collect their bribes from a growing pie but to do
this they must hold on to power and pander to their citizens in the short term
(by reducing corruption). Paldam (2002) argues that a growing economy has
got more resources to invest in corruption control. Either way, growth may
cause a reduction in corruption. Thirdly, as alluded to above, all the cor-
ruption indices are measured with error which may also bias inference. In
principle, the solution to all these problems is to use instrumental variables:
variables which are correlated with corruption (relevant), but uncorrelated
with all unobserved (or excluded) determinants of economic growth (valid).10
It is a nebulous task to nd such instruments and the ones commonly used in
the literature, e.g. ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Mauro, 1995) or the ex-
tent of democracy (Gupta et al. 2002), are problematic. While the presence
of many di¤erent ethic groups may foster corruption because o¢ cials may
favor their own group or because it leads to less coordinated bribe taking,
it is less clear that the degree of fractionalization is unrelated to economic
growth other than through its e¤ect on corruption. For example, Easterly
and Levine (1997) show that ethno-linguistic fractionalization is related to
economic growth in Africa. Likewise, countries with a long democratic tra-
dition have had time to establish checks and balances and the rule of law
which arguably will enable more e¤ective control of corruption. Although
10In principle, it is also possible to deal with some of these issues by exploring movements
in corruption over time within a country (Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2006). However, the
scope for doing this is limited by the fact that country experts often build their perceptions
about corruption up gradually over time. This introduces inertia in the corruption indices
and it is doubtful how informative the time series variation really is. It is also a problem
that there are inconsistencies over time in the way they are constructed and that the time
span for which the indices are available is relatively short (the ICRG index is available
from the early 1980s, the TI and WB index are available from the mid-1990s, and the
WBES index is available only for one year, 1999-2000). The later observation also implies
researchers trying to explain the growth experience from, say, 1960 to 2000 must assume
that corruption at the time it is measured, say in the 1990s, a¤ects this experience.
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it has been hard to establish any robust causal links between democracy
and economic development (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Acemoglu et al.
2008), recent research by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) has shown that
democratization may have positive growth e¤ects and Gundlach and Paldam
(2008) report evidence suggesting a long-run casual link running from income
to democracy.
With these caveats in mind, Tables 1 and 2 show the results of the three
types of tests. I use information on annually growth rates of real GDP per
capita over the period 1970 to 2000 in a sample of 60 to 80 developing and
developed countries. The size of the sample is dictated by available infor-
mation. It does not include any of the former socialist countries in Eastern
Europe or any of the states of the former Soviet Union.11 We condition on
the investment share, population growth, enrolment in primary education,
initial real GDP per capita and regional dummies in all specications. We
begin by studying the potential relationship between perceived corruption,
as represented by the TI index and the growth rate of real GDP per capita.12
The TI index ranks countries on a scale from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least
corrupt). To set the stage, regression 1 is a simple linear specication similar
to the one estimated by Mauro (1995). We observe a signicant negative
correlation between corruption and growth of roughly the same magnitude
as the one reported by him. However, regression 2, which uses the ethno-
linguistic fractionalization index and an index of the extent of democracy13
as instruments for corruption14, casts doubt on the causal nature of this
estimate: the coe¢ cient on corruption becomes insignicant.
[Table 1: The relationship between the TI index and the growth rate of
GDP per capita, 1970-2000.]
Regression 3 implements the rst of the three tests of the "greasing the
wheels hypothesis". As suggested by Méon and Sekkat (2005), the e¤ect of
corruption should, if the hypothesis is correct, interact systematically with
the quality of political institutions. This can be tested by including an in-
teraction between the TI index of corruption and variables that capture in-
stitutional quality. To this purpose, we use the variable "rule of law" which
11For a detailed discussion of sources, see Aidt et al. (2008).
12Similar results can be obtained with the other perception-based indexes (not reported).
13The variable is the Voice and Accountability Index from the World Banks "Gover-
nance Matters" database (Kaufmann et al., 2005). This index measures the extent to
which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of their government
and able to hold it accountable for its choices. The index has been re-scaled to lay in the
interval 0 (weak institutions) to 1 (strong institutions).
14The instruments pass the tests for relevance and validity.
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measures "the extent to which agents have condence in and abide by the
rules of society".15 We observe that corruption has a positive impact on
growth, but that this e¤ect is reduced (but never entirely reversed) in coun-
tries with better institutions. This is consistent with the "greasing the wheels
hypothesis". But it is unclear how robust the nding is: it does not hold up
to instrumentation; for many other governance indicators the e¤ects are in-
signicant; and Méon and Sekkat (2005), using a slightly larger sample and a
di¤erent specication16, report systematic evidence against the hypothesis.17
The second test, proposed by Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006), suggests
that the marginal e¤ect of corruption on growth depends on how widespread
corruption is. This can be tested by including the square of the TI index in
the empirical model or by including dummy variables for countries with high,
medium and low levels of corruption. The test using the quadratic term is,
however, inappropriate because the TI index is an ordinal ranking and not
measured on a cardinal scale. The test using dummy variables sidesteps this
issue but su¤ers from the problem that the denition of high, medium and
low levels of corruption is arbitrary. From regressions 4 and 7, it is clear
that the data rejects the notion of a growth maximizing level of corruption
in general. However, when the sample is split into two sub-samples, one
containing countries with a high degree of political freedom (as measured by
the Freedom House index of political rights) and one containing countries
without, we observe something interesting (see regressions 5, 6, 8 and 9).18
In countries with political freedom, but not in those without, corruption
appears to be benecial at the margin starting from a very low level for then
to become detrimental. According to regression 5, the growth maximizing
level of corruption occurs when the TI index is around 9, so it is only in
countries with a high degree of integrity that "a little corruption" is helpful.19
15This variable is also from the World Banks "Governance Matters" database (Kauf-
mann et al., 2005). It is representative of the governance variables that Méon and Sekkat
(2005) use to measure the quality of institutions.
16In contrast to my specication, they do not include the governance variable as separate
regressors.
17In a related study, Méon and Weill (2008) study the impact of corruption on aggre-
gate e¢ ciency. They report that corruption reduces e¢ ciency in societies with e¤ective
institutions, but improves aggregate e¢ ciency in societies with ine¤ective institutions.
18The Freedom House index of political rights codes countries according to several di-
mensions of political freedom, such as censorship, freedom of association, free elections
etc. The index ranges from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). I have split the sample using
3.5 as the cut-o¤.
19The scaling of the TI index matters greatly for this result. For example, if one inverts
the TI index, e.g. by subtracting it from 11, (which is often done in applied work) so that
it becomes increasing in corruption, the non-monotonic relationship reported in regression
5 is no longer statistically signicant.
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Moreover, we see from regression 8 that countries coded as having low or
medium levels of corruption record higher growth than countries coded as
being highly corrupt. But the positive growth di¤erential between countries
with medium and low levels of corruption is not statistically signicant and
the point estimates are very sensitive to the coding of the dummy variables.
This casts doubts on the robustness of the results reported by Méndez and
Sepúlveda (2006), and leaves two broader questions open. Firstly, even if
accepted at face value, it is doubtful if these results can be taken as evidence
that corruption is "benecial" for growth at low level of incidence. After all,
countries with a TI index above 9 (e.g., Denmark, Finland and Canada) are
hardly the types of countries for which Le¤ (1964) saw corruption as a means
of development. Secondly, how the sample is split into two is essentially
arbitrary.
The third test, proposed by Aidt et al. (2008), addresses this last point.
This is done by estimating a growth model that allows for endogenous thresh-
old e¤ects and the possibility of reverse causality from growth to corrup-
tion. More specically, the estimation procedure, which is due to Caner and
Hansen (2004), rstly identies di¤erent growth-corruption regimes and then
secondly estimates a regime specic relationship between the two using an
IV estimator. Using the Voice and Accountability Index from the World
Banks "Governance Matters" database as the measure of good governance,
the data is consistent with two distinct growth-corruption regimes: one with
good governance, high average growth and low corruption and one with poor
governance, low average growth and high corruption. Secondly, in regressions
10 and 11, which show the regime specic linear growth models, corruption
only has a negative impact on growth in the regime with good governance;
in the regime with poor governance, there is no statistically signicant ef-
fect of corruption on growth.20 This suggests that corruption has the least
detrimental e¤ect on growth in countries with poor governance, which is
consistent with the "greasing the wheels hypothesis".
However, there are at least two reasons to be suspicious about this in-
terpretation. Firstly, the fact that corruption has less of an e¤ect where
institutions are weak is consistent with the "greasing the wheels hypothe-
sis" but it is not the only valid explanation. Aidt et al. (2008) develop
an alternative theory that also produces the observed regime specic di¤er-
ence. In this theory, however, there is no sense what so ever that corruption
is e¢ ciency-enhancing: corruption has less of an impact on growth in the
20The regime-specic linear growth models are estimated using instrumental variables.
The instruments are the Voice and Accountability Index and the index of ethno-linguistic
fractionalizations. Similar results obtain with OLS and with alternative instruments.
Moreover, there is no evidence of a non-monotonic relationship in any of the two regimes.
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regime with poor governance simply because things cannot get much worse.
The evidence does not discriminate between these alternative explanations.
Secondly, looking for evidence of the "greasing the wheels hypothesis" in
macro data may simply be a fallacy of composition. The underlying theory
as well as the anecdotal evidence presented in its support identify instances
at the microeconomic level where corruption can enhance e¢ ciency. But will
there be macro e¤ects? Probably not, and as Mauro (1995, p. 685) points
out what is benecial for the individual may turn out to be detrimental for
society: ".. when individuals o¤er speed money to o¢ cials, they contribute
to establishing a custom, so that granting of, say, a license will be articially
delayed until a bribe is received. Corrupt practices such as speed money
(which may actually avoid delay for an individual) may therefore increases
red tape for the economy as a whole". What is more, as shown by Kauf-
mann and Wei (1999), corruption may not even be able to speed things up
for individuals.
As discussed above, the TI index, along with the ICRG and the WB
index, is problematic because it is based on perceptions about corruption,
perceptions which may be colored by observed economic performance. It is,
therefore, important to ask if the results presented in Table 1 can be repli-
cated with the WBES index that sets out to measure the actual experience
of managers with corruption. Table 2 shows that the answer is clearly no:
the WBES index is, with one expectation, insignicant in all regressions.
[Table 2: The relationship between the WBES index and the growth rate
of GDP per capita, 1970-2000.]
At the face of it, this seems to suggest that actual, as opposed to per-
ceived, corruption is irrelevant for economic growth, but this is too strong
a conclusion. Firstly, eighteen countries drop out of the sample because
they were not surveyed, and they are almost all of them countries with good
governance. The average e¤ect of the WBES index on growth is therefore
dominated by countries with poor governance and we know from Table 1
that it is among these that (perceived) corruption has the weakest correla-
tion with growth. Secondly, in regressions 21 and 22, which show the IV
estimations of the two-regime model, actual corruption is signicant in the
regime with good governance (albeit this is based on only 17 countries).21
There is, therefore, a sense in which the two sets of results are sending
the same message: the macroeconomic evidence, if anything, shows that the
average e¤ect of corruption on growth is close to zero, but that it may have
21Restricting attention to the 42 countries for which the WBES index is available has
little e¤ect on the results presented in Table 1.
15
a negative (marginal) e¤ect in countries with otherwise strong governance.
As argued above this should not be taken as evidence of e¢ ciency-enhancing
corruption, a conclusion which is further strengthened by a vast literature
that studies the e¤ects of corruption on the constituents of growth. This lit-
erature shows that (perceived) corruption is negatively related to investment
(Mauro, 1995); that it distorts the portfolio of public spending towards less
productive activities (Mauro, 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998) or it creates
ine¢ ciently large public sectors where resources that should have been used
productively are wasted through rent seeking (Baldacci et al., 2004); and
that it increases military spending (Gupta et al., 2001). The only possible
exception to this pattern is with respect to foreign direct investment (FDI).
While Wei (2000) reports that corruption acts like a tax on international
investments and Hines (1995) documents that US FDI mostly go to less cor-
rupt countries, Egger and Winner (2005) and Sena and Martianova (2008)
report evidence that corruption might encourage FDI.
5 Corruption and Genuine Investment
The research into the consequences of corruption on growth in GDP per
capita and the constituencies of growth has provided many useful and im-
portant insights, but there is a sense in which it may be barking up the wrong
tree. Ultimately, development is about sustainable improvements in human
welfare. It is widely recognized that GDP per capita is not a measure of
this.22
In recent years, progress has been made in constructing empirical mea-
sures of sustainability and in developing the underlying theory (Dasgupta,
2001, chapter 9; Hamilton and Clemens, 1999). Loosely speaking, sustainable
development is related to an economys ability to maintain living standards
through time. More precisely, Arrow et al. (2004) suggest that an economy
is sustainable at a given point in time if its intertemporal social welfare at
that time is not decreasing. The most important determinant of intertem-
poral social welfare is an economys productive base. This base consists of
all its capital assets, including manufactured capital, human capital, natural
capital and the knowledge base, and its institutions. The change in the pro-
ductive base is called genuine investment. It can be expressed as the sum
of the values of investment or disinvestment in the underlying capital assets,
where the assets are priced at their social opportunity cost. As shown by
22I am not the rst to recognize this general point within the context of corruption.
Gupta et al. (2002), for example, study the impact of corruption on various measures of
inequality.
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Dasgupta and Mäler (2000), intertemporal social welfare is nondecreasing
if and only if genuine investment is non-negative. Thus, if one can some-
how measure empirically genuine investment or, equivalently, the change in
an economys genuine wealth over time, then one can start asking questions
about sustainable development and its link to corruption.
Fortunately, based on the work by Hamilton and Clemens (1999), the
World Bank has for the last 10 years published measures of genuine in-
vestment.23 The starting point for calculating genuine investment is gross
national saving from which an estimate of consumption of xed capital is de-
duced. To this is added a measure of investment in human capital (education
expenditures) and estimates of disinvestment in natural resources (damage
from CO2 emissions, energy depletion, mineral depletion and net forest de-
pletion) are deducted.24 The result is a rough estimate of genuine investment.
This, however, does not take population growth into account. There are two
di¤erent ways of converting genuine investment as percentage of GNI into
growth in genuine wealth per capita. Arrow et al. (2003) and Arrow et al.
(2004) start by converting the estimate of average genuine investment as a
percentage of GNI into a growth rate of genuine wealth by multiplying with
a presumed GNI-wealth ratio25 and then subtracting the population growth
rate from this. Hamilton (2005), on the other hand, estimates genuine wealth
per capita directly from adjusted consumption data and assumptions about
the consumption rate of interest and the rate of growth of per capita con-
sumption and then calculates the change over time. It goes without saying
that these estimates are rough and ready, but the fact that the data is con-
structed using two alternative methods allows for some robustness analysis.
The question I am interested in here is whether there exists a link be-
tween corruption, both perceived and actual, and growth in genuine wealth
per capita. To answer this question, I have estimated the impact of the TI
index and the WBES index on the two measures of growth in genuine wealth
per capita. I control for other potential determinants of sustainability such
as initial income (real GDP per capita in 1970), geography (regional dum-
mies), education (enrollment in primary education) and political and legal
institutions. The results are striking and shown in Tables 3 and 4. Corrup-
tion reduces the growth rate of genuine wealth substantially. Importantly,
23See World Development Indicators (various years, Table 3.15). The World Develop-
ment Indicators uses the term genuine saving. Here, I follow Arrow et al. (2004) and use
the term genuine investment.
24For details of how to estimate these deductions, see World Development Indicators
(various years) or Arrow et al. (2004).
25They use a ratio of 0.2 for industrialized countries and a ratio of 0.15 for developing
and oil-rich countries.
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both actual (the WBES index) and perceived corruption (the TI index) are
negatively related to growth in genuine wealth per capita. This continues to
be true when I estimate the relationship using an IV estimator.26 In fact,
the IV estimates are more precise and larger in magnitude than the corre-
sponding OLS estimates, perhaps suggesting a downwards bias in the latter.
A direct comparison of Table 3 and 4 shows that it does not matter much
which of the two alternative measures of growth in genuine wealth per capita
that I use.
To get an idea of how large these e¤ects are, imagine, for example, that
India were to "adopt" the (perceived) corruption level of the United King-
dom.27 As a consequence of this, Indias growth rate of genuine wealth per
capita would go up from about 1 per cent to 3:4 per cent per annum.28 Or
alternatively, one can ask by how much (perceived) corruption in the United
Kingdom could increase before the UK economy became unsustainable? Us-
ing the OLS estimate from regression 23 and keeping initial GDP per capita
and geography xed, the answer is that the TI index would have to fall from
8:65 to just below 2. Countries with such a low score include Russia and
Uganda. Using instead the IV estimate from regression 24, the UK econ-
omy would become unsustainable once its TI index falls to the level of Italy
(which has a score of 4:7). All in all, the estimates point to economic as well
as statistical signicance.
It is also interesting to notice, from regressions 31, 32, 43 and 44, that
political freedom29 (democracy, a free press etc.) increases growth in gen-
uine wealth and thus contributes positively to sustainable development. La
Porta et al. (1997) and others have argued that legal origin, in particular
whether the legal code is based on the Civil or the Common law tradition,
matters for economic and nancial development. Using a dummy variable
equal to one if a country belongs to the Common law tradition as a proxy for
legal origin, I nd no correlation between the legal system and sustainable
development (regressions 33, 34, 45 and 46). Clearly, these ndings warrant
further investigation which should take into account potential endogeneity.
In conclusion, the evidence presented in Tables 3 and 4 suggests that
corruption (however measured) is a hindrance for sustainable development.
Societies with high levels of corruption seem to be running down their gen-
uine wealth and be putting their economies on a path with declining in-
tertemporal welfare. On reection, this is, perhaps, not overly surprising as
corruption, theft and rent seeking often feed on rents generated through un-
26I use the same instruments as in the growth regressions.
27The TI index for India is 2.85 while that for the United Kingdom is 8.65.
28This is based on the estimated coe¢ cient on the TI index in regression 23 in Table 3.
29As measured by the Freedom House index of political rights.
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sustainable use of natural resources (Leite and Weidmann, 2002) or through
under-investment in human and manufactured capital (Mauro, 1998).
[Table 3: The relationship between corruption and the growth rate of
genuine wealth per capita (as dened by Arrow et al. (2004))]
[Table 4: The relationship between corruption and the growth rate of
genuine wealth per capita (as dened by Hamilton (2005))]
6 Conclusion
Does corruption, then, sand or grease the wheels? While corruption in a
very narrow sense can be seen as a lubricator that may speed things up
and help entrepreneurs getting on with wealth creation in specic instances,
in a broader sense, corruption must be considered as an obstacle to devel-
opment. This is so for a number of related reasons. One is the fallacy of
e¢ cient corruption: the cumbersome procedures that corruption is supposed
to help overcome may be created and maintained precisely because of their
corruption potential and substantial real resources may be devoted to con-
testing the associated rents. This leads to pure waste and to misallocation
of resources. There is also a fallacy of composition lurking: undisputed, but
isolated, instances of e¢ ciency-enhancing corruption at the microeconomic
level cannot be taken as evidence that corruption can be e¢ ciency-enhancing
at the macroeconomic level.
Both the micro and macro evidence evaluated here support this view.
Quantitative evidence from eld studies and surveys points to substantial
costs of corruption. At the macro level, although the search for a negative
e¤ect of corruption on the average growth rate of GDP per capita has failed
to produce convincing and robust evidence, this does not imply that cor-
ruption is irrelevant (or even benecial) at the marcroeconomic level. At
least in societies with otherwise good governance and strong political insti-
tutions, corruption reduces growth at the margin. More importantly, even
if the average e¤ect of corruption on GDP growth is close to zero, the new
evidence presented above suggests that corruption is a signicant hindrance
for sustainable development. Arguably, I have only scratched the surface.
Much more work is needed to establish how robust and causal the correla-
tion between corruption and the growth rate of genuine wealth per capita is
and to construct better measures of genuine wealth. Nevertheless, as Das-
gupta (2009) rightly points out, we should be shifting our attention away
from growth in GDP per capita to growth in genuine wealth and start asking
19
questions about what role economic, political and legal institutions play in
promoting accumulation of genuine wealth and sustainable development.
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Table 1: The relationship between the TI index and the growth rate of GDP per capita, 1970-2000. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Sample Full Full Full Full Political 
freedom 
Absence 
of 
political 
freedom 
Full Political 
freedom 
Absence 
of 
political 
freedom 
Good 
governance 
Poor 
governance 
TI Index 0.27** 
[2.27] 
0.29 
[1.36] 
-0.58** 
[2.31] 
0.27 
[0.90] 
0.67** 
[2.11] 
-0.95 
[1.58] 
   0.38*** 
[3.28] 
1.09 
[1.52] 
TI-index*Rule 
of Law 
  0.36 
[1.43] 
        
Rule of Law   6.24*** 
[2.76] 
        
TI index 
squared 
   0.0001 
[0.01] 
-0.038* 
[1.73] 
0.099 
[1.66] 
     
TI index > 9       1.12 
[1.47] 
1.23* 
[1.85] 
2.13 
[1.01] 
  
3 < TI index < 
9 
      0.84 
[1.47] 
1.31** 
[2.12] 
-0.51 
[0.89] 
  
Initial GDP -0.003*** 
[4.95] 
-0.003*** 
[3.67] 
-0.003*** 
[5.28] 
-0.003*** 
[4.82] 
-0.003*** 
[2.93] 
-0.01 
[1.52] 
-0.003*** 
[4.45] 
-0.003** 
[2.33] 
-0.01*** 
[4.60] 
-0.003*** 
[2.89] 
-0.003** 
[2.24] 
Population 
growth 
-0.43 
[1.22] 
-0.41 
[1.25] 
0.075 
[0.22] 
-0.43 
[1.16] 
-0.26 
[0.94] 
-1.57 
[1.52] 
-0.35 
[0.97] 
-0.29 
[1.04] 
0.19 
[0.17] 
-0.21 
[0.58] 
-1.96* 
[1.94] 
Initial 
investment 
share 
0.02 
[0.54] 
0.022 
[0.57] 
0.002 
[0.07] 
0.02 
[0.55] 
0.052 
[0.91] 
0.099* 
[1.90] 
0.029 
[0.76] 
0.096* 
[1.84] 
0.06 
[0.84] 
0.001 
[0.04] 
0.08 
[1.55] 
Enrollment in 
primary 
education 
0.02 
[1.59] 
0.017 
[1.47] 
0.032** 
[2.57] 
0.02 
[1.60] 
0.016 
[0.61] 
0.008 
[0.56] 
0.021 
[1.47] 
0.011 
[0.45] 
0.03 
[1.38] 
-0.023 
[0.54] 
0.002 
[0.23] 
J-statistics  0.90        0.66 0.66 
1st stage F test  16.3***        29.9*** 29.9*** 
Estimation 
method 
OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Threshold 
IV 
Threshold 
IV 
Observations 60 58 60 60 43 17 60 43 17 33 25 
R-squared 0.54  0.63 0.54 0.51 0.8 0.52 0.45 0.85   
Notes: Robust t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Include regional dummies and a constant term; J-statistics: the p-value of Hansen's J-test for the 
Null that the extra instrument is valid; 1st stage F test: The Null is that the coefficients on both instruments are zero; Political freedom (Absence of) is the sub-sample with countries with a score below 
(above) 3.5 on the Freedom House index of political right; Good (poor) governance is the sub-sample of countries with a score above (below) 0.65 on the normalized Voice and Accountability Index. 
The instruments are the Voice and Accountability Index and the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index. 
Table 2: The relationship between the WBES index and the growth rate of GDP per capita, 1970-2000. 
 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Sample Full Full Full Full Political 
freedom 
Absence 
of 
political 
freedom 
Full Political 
freedom 
Absence 
of 
political 
freedom 
Good 
governance 
Poor 
governance 
WBES Index 0.544 
[1.32] 
0.74 
[0.99] 
-0.73 
[1.44] 
-1.49 
[0.95] 
-1.38 
[0.58] 
-5.04 
[1.02] 
   1.25*** 
[3.00] 
0.019 
[0.03] 
WBES Index*Rule 
of Law 
  1.36 
[1.65] 
        
Rule of Law   -2.05 
[0.49] 
        
WBES index 
squared 
   0.24 
[1.25] 
0.22 
[0.85] 
0.61 
[1.05] 
     
WBES index > 5       0.14 
[0.19] 
-1.36 
[0.87] 
0.24 
[0.25] 
  
3 < WBES index < 5       -0.37 
[0.70] 
-1.92 
[1.20] 
0.28 
[0.14] 
  
Initial GDP -0.003*** 
[5.00] 
-0.003*** 
[4.20] 
-0.003*** 
[4.84] 
-0.003*** 
[4.32] 
-0.003*** 
[2.06] 
-0.0001 
[0.66] 
-0.003*** 
[3.97] 
-0.0001 
[1.18] 
-0.001 
[0.81] 
-0.0001 
[0.54] 
-0.0001 
[1.49] 
Population growth -0.77 
[1.56] 
-0.74 
[1.46] 
-0.42 
[0.78] 
-0.63 
[0.66] 
-0.25 
[0.66] 
-2.11 
[1.23] 
-0.74 
[1.55] 
-0.50 
[1.62] 
-3.07 
[1.21] 
0.42 
[0.80] 
-3.06*** 
[3.57] 
Initial investment 
share 
0.034 
[0.68] 
0.032 
[0.73] 
0.008 
[0.17] 
0.027 
[0.55] 
0.067 
[0.70] 
0.083 
[1.82] 
0.034 
[0.56] 
0.055 
[0.73] 
0.093 
[1.90] 
-0.002 
[0.03] 
0.084*** 
[3.09] 
Enrollment in 
primary education 
-0.021 
[1.16] 
-0.025 
[1.34] 
-0.005 
[0.32] 
-0.014 
[0.78] 
0.02 
[0.52] 
-0.002 
[0.13] 
-0.003 
[0.18] 
0.038 
[0.99] 
-0.032 
[1.13] 
0.029 
[0.39] 
-0.017 
[1.13] 
            
J-statistics  0.77        0.64 0.64 
1st stage F test  6.8**        13.7*** 13.7*** 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Threshold 
IV 
Threshold 
IV 
Observations 42 41 42 42 27 15 42 27 15 17 24 
R-squared 0.54  0.61 0.56 0.45 0.79 0.51 0.42 0.83   
Notes: See Table 1. 
Table 3: The relationship between corruption and the growth rate of genuine wealth per capita (as defined by Arrow et al. (2004)). 
 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
TI index 0.42*** 
[2.74] 
0.97*** 
[3.50] 
  0.40** 
[2.51] 
1.05*** 
[3.62] 
  0.36** 
[2.47] 
 0.45*** 
[2.75] 
 
WBES Index   0.80* 
[1.95] 
2.04*** 
[2.70] 
  1.05** 
[2.16] 
2.51*** 
[3.06] 
 0.70* 
[1.88] 
 0.81* 
[1.91] 
Initial GDP -0.17** 
[2.00] 
-0.37*** 
[2.83] 
-0.15* 
[1.85] 
-0.31** 
[2.17] 
-0.21** 
[2.58] 
-0.44*** 
[3.21] 
-0.17* 
[1.87] 
-0.34** 
[2.25] 
-0.23** 
[2.46] 
-0.21** 
[2.27] 
-0.15* 
[1.73] 
-0.15 
[1.67] 
Enrollment in 
primary education 
    0.02 
[1.27] 
0.001 
[0.02] 
-0.025 
[1.16] 
-0.057* 
[1.96] 
    
Political Freedom         -0.279* 
[1.80] 
-0.28* 
[1.67] 
  
Common Law           -0.53 
[1.08] 
-0.01 
[0.02] 
J-statistics  0.91  0.78  0.73  0.78     
1st stage F test  12.1***  10.4***  15.9**  16.1***     
Estimation method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations 73 59 52 41 65 58 47 41 72 52 72 51 
R-squared 0.60  0.52  0.58  0.51  0.62 0.55 0.60 0.51 
Notes: Robust t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Include regional dummies and a constant term; J-statistics: the p-value of Hansen's J-test for the 
Null that the extra instrument is valid; 1st stage F test: The Null is that the coefficients on both instruments are zero; The instruments are the Voice and Accountability Index and the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index. 
 
Table 4: The relationship between corruption and the growth rate of genuine wealth per capita (as defined by Hamilton (2005)). 
 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 
             
TI index 0.35*** 
[2.77] 
0.75*** 
[3.84] 
  0.31** 
[2.57] 
0.72*** 
[3.64] 
  0.31** 
[2.50] 
 0.35** 
[2.66] 
 
             
WBES Index   1.04*** 
[2.83] 
2.05*** 
[4.22] 
  0.99** 
[2.66] 
2.05*** 
[3.83] 
 0.96*** 
[3.03] 
 1.01** 
[2.68] 
             
Initial GDP -0.18** 
[2.34] 
-0.31*** 
[3.14] 
-0.14* 
[1.97] 
-0.25** 
[2.44] 
-0.19*** 
[2.82] 
-0.31*** 
[3.07] 
-0.14* 
[2.02] 
-0.25** 
[2.40] 
-0.24*** 
[3.13] 
-0.20*** 
[2.86] 
-0.17** 
[2.29] 
-0.16** 
[2.34] 
             
Enrollment in 
primary education 
    0.027** 
[2.13] 
0.013 
[1.36] 
0.004 
[0.38] 
-0.013 
[0.88] 
    
             
Political Freedom         -0.27* 
[1.84] 
-0.32** 
[2.45] 
  
             
Common Law           -0.092 
[0.23] 
0.34 
[0.71] 
             
J-statistics  0.42  0.35  0.81  0.48     
1st stage F test  16.1***  8.2***  14.3**  7.7***     
Estimation method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations 65 52 49 39 59 52 44 39 65 49 64 48 
R-squared 0.40  0.56  0.45  0.52  0.46 0.63 0.40 0.57 
Notes:  See Table 3. 
 
 
